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Abstract 
 
Two decades ago, 93% of the world’s poor lived in countries officially classified as 
Low Income (LICs). Now, 72% of the world’s poor live in Middle Income Countries 
(MICs). The dramatic shift has been brought about by fast growth in a number of countries 
with large populations. On present trends, the poor in the MICs are likely to make up a 
substantial proportion of global poor for many years to come. This “new geography of 
global poverty”—with the mass of the poor living in stable, non-poor countries--raises 
important questions for the current model of development assistance, where national per 
capita income is a key determinant of the volume and composition of aid flows. What 
precisely is the nature of global moral obligation towards the poor in non-poor countries? 
Should aid allocation be targeted equally to the poor in poor and non-poor countries, or 
should special weight be given to the poor in poor countries? How, if at all, should 
international agencies with a focus on poverty reduction re-calibrate their engagement in 
MICs? The objective of this paper is to begin addressing these questions to spark greater 
debate on the new geography of global poverty.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The incidence of poverty in a country--the fraction of people living below an 
absolute poverty line—depends both on average income and on the inequality around this 
average. For given inequality, the higher the average, the lower is poverty. But if there is 
inequality, there can be poverty even if average income is above the poverty line. Beyond 
the incidence of poverty, the total number of poor depends also on the total population of 
the country. 
 
In international poverty calculations, the standard poverty line used is the World 
Bank’s $1.25 per person per day in 2005 PPP. In some calculations, a higher poverty line 
of $2.50 per person per day in 2005 PPP is also used (Chen and Ravallion, 2008). In 
international country classifications, a middle income country (MIC) is one whose average 
income exceeds a critical threshold. While the details of the calculation are elaborate, this 
threshold is roughly equivalent to $2.70 per capita per day in 2008 exchange rates. This is 
nominally above the higher of the two commonly used poverty lines for international 
comparisons. Even given the differences between exchange rate and PPP conversions, 
MICs are countries that have crossed the standard international absolute poverty line on 
average.2
 
 But if there is within-country inequality, poverty will persist in these countries. 
And the larger is the population of these countries, the greater will be their contribution to 
global poverty. 
 The spectacular growth of a number of populous countries over the last two decades 
has changed the global map of poverty. On the one hand, growth in countries such as China 
and India has contributed to dramatic reductions in the incidence of global poverty—indeed 
the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG), of halving the incidence of poverty 
between 1990 and 2015, will be met at the global level. The sharp decreases in poverty in 
fast growing populous countries have more than exceeded the rise in poverty elsewhere, 
especially in the low income countries (LICs) in Africa. However, two decades of this 
process has led to another feature of the global map of poverty—more and more of the 
remaining poor now live in MICs. Indeed, by some estimates, 72% of the world’s poor 
according to the lower global poverty line now live in countries whose average incomes 
exceed the higher global poverty line (Sumner, 2010). 
 
 This paper argues that the ‘new geography of global poverty’ —with the mass of 
the world’s poor living in MICs-- raises important questions for the current model of 
development assistance, where levels and composition of aid flows are determined by 
national per capita income and the official country classifications that follow from it. What 
precisely are the global moral obligations towards the poor in non-poor countries? Should 
aid allocation be targeted equally to poor people in poor and non-poor countries, or should 
special weight be given to the poor in poor countries? How, if at all, should international 
agencies with a focus on poverty reduction re-calibrate their engagement with MICs? 
 
 The objective of this paper is to begin addressing these questions, to spark greater 
debate on the implications of the new geography of global poverty. Section 2 reprises 
                                                 
2 In all MICs, the GNI per capita PPP is higher than the $1.25 international poverty line. 
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earlier findings on the new composition of global poverty, and argues that these patterns 
are likely to continue into the coming decade. Section 3 takes up the questions on 
development assistance. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of areas for future research 
and policy debate. 
 
2.  WHERE DO THE POOR LIVE? A REPRISE 
 
In Sumner (2010) data is presented to argue that the global poverty problem has 
changed because most of the world’s poor (defined as those living under $1.25 per capita 
per day at PPP) no longer live in poor countries (defined as those whose per capita income 
at official exchange rates are below the official cutoff defining low income countries, or 
LICs).  This is because a number of the large countries that have graduated into the middle 
income category (MICs) still have large numbers of poor people.  The paper argues there is 
a new bottom billion - 960m poor people or 72% of the world’s poor- and they live not in 
poor countries but in middle income countries (and most of them in stable, non-fragile 
MICs). Only about a quarter of the world’s poor – about 370mn people or so − live in the 
remaining 40 low-income countries (LICs), which are largely in sub-Saharan Africa. This 
is a dramatic change from just two decades ago when 93% of poor people lived in low-
income countries.   
 
 The poor haven’t moved of course. What has largely happened is that the countries 
in which many of the world’s poor live in have got richer in average per capita terms and 
have been reclassified. With growth, countries transitioning from LIC to MIC status under 
World Bank classifications have led to a ‘new bottom billion”. Since 2000, 27 countries 
have graduated and 707m poor people ‘moved’ into MIC countries because despite growth 
the absolute number of poor people hasn’t fallen sufficiently in these countries.3
 
 
 It is worth exploring this pattern in greater detail to check how much of it is due to 
the “China and India” contribution, and how much of it may be due to the “Fragile 
States/Stable States” distinction. Table 1 presents numbers for combinations of economic 
development (low income and middle income) and of political development (fragile and 
non-fragile states). Thus it is seen that stable MICs still account for 61% of the world’s 
poor. However, most of this is because of Asia. Table 2 shows that within Africa, two 
thirds of the poor live in fragile states. 
 
China and India, together account for 50% of the world’s poor (about 663m) in 
2007-8, down from 68% in 1990. However, the story isn’t just that India and China have 
been ‘upgraded’ to MIC status. If one removes China and India the proportion of the 
world’s poor in MICs has still tripled – this is a range of other countries like Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Indonesia but also some surprising MIC countries like Sudan, Angola and 
Cameroon. There is a concentration of the poor - 850m - in 5 populous MIC countries in 
particular (see Table 2). These are the Pakistan, India, China, Nigeria, Indonesia country 
group (henceforth the PICNICs). Figure 1 summarizes the evolution of poverty numbers 
for combinations of income level and fragility status. 
 
                                                 
3 The Solomon Islands slipped back to LIC status. 
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Table 1.  Where do the US$1.25 poor live?  
 
 1988-90 or nearest 
year 
2007/08 or nearest 
year 
Low income, stable (e.g. Tanzania and Zambia) 80% 16% 
Low income, fragile conflict-affected state (e.g. DRC and Burundi) 13% 12% 
Middle income, stable (e.g. India and Indonesia) 6% 61% 
Middle income, fragile conflict-affected state (e.g. Pakistan and 
Nigeria) 
1% 11% 
Source: Sumner (2010) processed from World Development Indicators; FCAS definition = 43 countries of combined 3 lists as per OECD 
(2010). 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Global and regional distribution of the poor, US$1.25, 2007-8 
 
 
 Fragile and conflict-
affected 
Not fragile or conflict-
affected 
Total 
World 
Low income 12% 16% 28% 
Middle income 11% 61% 72% 
Total 23% 77% 100% 
Africa 
Low income 37% 29% 66% 
Middle income 30% 4% 34% 
Total 67% 33% 100% 
Asia 
Low income 2% 12% 14% 
Middle income 4% 82% 86% 
Total 6% 94% 100% 
Source: Processed from World Development Indicators. 
 
Table 3.  Where do the poor live? 
 
 
Ten countries with highest poverty 
(millions) 
LIC or MIC in 2010  
(basis is 2008 data) 
Number of Poor People 
(millions, US$1.25, 2007-8) 
1. India MIC 456 
2. China MIC 208 
3. Nigeria MIC 89 
4. Bangladesh LIC 76 
5. Indonesia MIC 66 
6. DRC LIC 36 
7. Pakistan MIC 35 
8. Tanzania LIC 30 
9. Ethiopia LIC 29 
10. Philippines MIC 20 
Source: Processed from World Development Indicators. 
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Figure 1. Where are the world’s poor? 1990 vs. 2007-8 
 
 
 
How do patterns of income poverty compare with patterns of deprivation in non-
income dimensions? With the exception of children out of school, there is surprisingly little 
difference between different poverty measures and the global poverty distributions 
generated. As shown by table 4 for income and nutrition and MPI, LICs account for 28–29 
per cent of the world’s poor; MICs for 70–72 per cent; SSA for 24–28 per cent; 
China/India for 43–50 per cent and FCAS 23–30 per cent. However, the education measure 
– the global distribution of the world’s poor by children who are not in primary school – 
does generate a more even split between LICs and MICs. Further, new IMR data released 
just before the MDG summit suggest a 40/60 LIC/MIC split on infant deaths too. This 
might suggest different poverty manifestations in LICs and MICs along some non-income 
dimensions. 
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Table 4.  Global distribution of world’s poor (percentage) by various measures, 2007–8 
 
 
 US$1.25 Children 
out of 
primary 
school 
Children 
below 
height 
Children 
below 
weight 
Multi-
dimensional 
poverty 
(MPI) 
Middle-income country (MIC) 72 56 71 71 70 
MIC minus China and India 22 - 28 23 22 
MIC FCAS 11 35 15 14 13 
MIC NON-FCAS 61 21 56 58 57 
Low-income country (LIC) 28 39 28 28 29 
LIC minus China and India 28 - - - - 
LIC FCAS 12 26 16 16 15 
LIC NON-FCAS 16 13 12 12 14 
      
Fragile and conflict-affected states (43) 23 61 31 30 29 
Sub-Sahara Africa 27 54 27 24 28 
Least Development Countries (50)* 25 40 27 27 27 
China and India 50 - 43 48 - 
      
Total 100 95* 99* 99* 100 
Countries with data as % global 
population 
80 74 81 84 78 
Source: Sumner (2010); Note: * = does not add up to 100% exactly due to rounding up components and education poverty in HICs; Least 
Developed Countries = group of 50 countries although Cape Verde graduated in 2006 and some of these LDCs are now MICs. 
 
  
 Will this pattern of concentration of the poor in MICs continue in the future? The 
answer to this question depends upon: growth projections for individual countries; 
assumptions on exchange rate evolution; assumptions on international inflation and other 
aspects of the Atlas methodology for classifying countries as LICs or MICs; the evolution 
of income distribution within each country; any re-evaluation of PPPs in each country (and 
influence on $1.25 poverty) and population growth in individual countries. Chandy and 
Gertz (2011) have recently provided an impressive and systematic set of poverty 
projections to 2015. We believe that some of their assumptions, for example concerning 
static inequality in MICs (and LICs), might overstate the extent of poverty reduction in 
MICs to 2015. However, even with these assumptions they find that the proportion of the 
world’s poor in MICs will still be 55% in 2015. So, it seems that the new geography of 
poverty will be with us for at least a decade or more. 
 
3.  Development Assistance in Light of the New Global Patterns of Poverty 
 
National per capita income is central to the allocation of development assistance—
its levels and its composition. For example, it is an explicit component of the IDA-
allocation formula, which combines needs and performance. Much has been written about 
the performance component of the formula (Kanbur, 2005, and Leo, 2010). For IDA, and 
for many other multilateral and bilateral donors, “low-income” classifications of countries 
are also central in targeting development assistance, the argument once again being one of 
greater need in these countries.4
                                                 
4 For example, DFID has a 90/10 LIC/MIC allocation ‘rule’ for aid allocation.  See DFID (2010).  
 For those donors and multilateral agencies who continue 
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engagement with MICs, there is the additional issue of how this engagement should differ, 
if at all, from their engagement with MICs. (Kanbur, 2010, and Independent Evaluation 
Group, 2007). What is the rationale for differentiated strategies between MICs and LICs 
and how would it be affected by the new reality that the bulk of the world’s poor now live 
in MICs? 
 
These questions are particularly important in the new geography of global poverty, 
where most of the world’s poor live in non-poor countries. Why should development 
assistance flow to countries whose per capita income is now above the international 
poverty line, with the implication that poverty persists solely because of inequality in these 
countries? Kanbur (2010) argues that the development cooperation literature identifies 
three arguments for continued assistance—“pockets of poverty”, “spillover effects” and 
“knowledge transfer”. There is a fourth argument, drawn from the philosophical literature, 
on moral obligation based on exploitative relations (Miller, 2010). Let us take each of these 
in turn, focusing in particular on the poverty discussion. 
 
3a.  Assisting MICs to Minimize Global Poverty 
 
The pockets of poverty argument rests on the moral intuition that assistance is 
called for by poverty no matter where it occurs—whether in poor countries or in non-poor 
countries. It is poor people who matter fundamentally, and poor countries matter only 
indirectly, as a leading indicator of where the poor might live. And it is of course this 
indicator that might be brought into question in the new global patterns of poverty. But a 
counter to the argument that development assistance should still flow to non-poor countries 
because of the large numbers of poor people they contain, is the following: is not the fact of 
persistence of poverty despite high per capita income levels itself an indicator of the likely 
ineffectiveness of assistance in reaching the poor in these countries? This ineffectiveness 
might be either because of weakness of the poverty reduction objective in these countries, 
or weakness in the capacity to target the poor. But in fact it is often argued (e.g. 
Independent Evaluation Group, 2007) that MICs have greater capacity for implementing 
pro-poor interventions such as safety nets. How can these different strands be disentangled 
to develop a framework in which the claims of MICs versus LICs for development 
assistance can be assessed? 
 
 We begin exploring this issue by imagining that we have a fixed budget for poverty 
alleviation. How should it be spent? The answer depends on the precise objective, and on 
the constraints face by the policy maker. For concreteness, we will assume poverty to be 
measured by the Pα class of poverty indices (Foster et al., 1984). As is well known, P0 is 
simply the incidence of poverty, the fraction of population below the poverty line; P1 is the 
poverty gap measure, the per capita proportional shortfall of the incomes from the poverty 
line; P2, the squared gap measure, gives greater weight to the poorest of the poor and hence 
is a measure of the severity of poverty.  
 
To start with, suppose there are no nation states, and that the poor can be targeted 
directly and costlessly. Then the allocation policy will be determined by the poverty 
measure that is to be minimized. If P0 is the objective then the marginal allocation goes to 
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the person closest to the poverty line. If P1 is the objective, then the impact of the marginal 
dollar is the same whichever of the poor it goes to. Finally, with P2 as the objective, the 
very poorest should be targeted for the marginal allocation (Bourguignon and Fields, 
1990). 
 
 Let us now introduce nation states into the story. This complicates the analysis in 
two central ways. Firstly, it raises the question of whether the poor can be targeted directly, 
or whether the targeting is only indirect, to be reached through allocation to the nation state 
in the first instance, and then from the nation state to the poor. Secondly, it raises the 
question of what exactly is the global objective function which the allocation of resources 
should be trying to achieve. One view is that it should still be minimization of global 
poverty, as measured by the Pα family of indices, say. This view in effect denies any moral 
significance of the nation state per se. An alternative set of views tackles the issue of the 
moral salience of the nation state itself, and what this means for obligations to the poor who 
live in non-poor countries. We will take up these perspectives in turn. 
 
 Start with global poverty reduction as the objective, and suppose again that nation 
states have the same objective and that money given to them will be targeted to the poor as 
required by the objective. Thus, if the global objective is reducing P0, and this is the 
national objective for each country as well, then the marginal allocation should go to the 
country where most poor are closest to the poverty line. If the objective changes to P1 then 
at the margin there will be indifference on which country will be favoured in the allocation 
of development assistance. In this situation an operational allocation rule in proportion to 
the numbers of poor would be consistent with the objective of global poverty minimization, 
Finally, if the objective globally and nationally is P2, say, then each country will allocate 
the assistance it gets to benefit its poorest. Hence from the global perspective the marginal 
allocation should favour the country where the poorest of the poor in the world live. 
 
 Consider now the situation where each country’s allocation rule can be 
characterized as simply equal division of the assistance received among all the people in 
the country, poor and non-poor. This may be because the country does not have the 
capacity to target, or because it has the capacity to target but its objective is insufficiently 
egalitarian to target towards the poor. Given this structure, what should a global allocation 
rule look like if the objective is reducing poverty? The answer (Kanbur, 1987, Dasgupta 
and Kanbur, 2005) is that if the objective is Pα, countries with a high P(α-1) should be 
targeted. Thus, for example, if P2 is the global objective then at the margin funds should 
flow to countries with high P1; if P1 is the objective then funds should flow to countries 
with high P0. 
 
 With the above framework in mind, let us assess the error that would be made by 
excluding MICs from development assistance (or at least reducing assistance to them 
drastically). If the objective is minimization of P2 and perfect targeting is implemented 
country by country, then excluding MICs hurts the global poverty reduction objective if the 
poorest in the MIC are also among the global poorest. If P0 is the objective then the answer 
depends on whether the numbers just below the poverty line in MICs are greater than those 
numbers in LICs. If perfect targeting is not possible, in fact if poor and non-poor benefit 
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equally from assistance within each country, then if P2 (P1) is the global objective, 
excluding MICs hurts the global objective if MICs have a higher P1 (P0) than LICs. 
 
 The case for excluding MICs from development assistance is thus strongest if the 
central model of the impact of aid is one where targeting to the poor is weak, since the 
guiding criterion then is the level of P1 (if the objective is P2) or P0 (if the objective is P1). It 
is unlikely that MICs will have higher P0 or higher P1 than LICs—there is in general a 
negative correlation between per capita income and poverty. The case for not excluding 
MICs from development assistance is strongest if the poor can be targeted effectively and if 
the global objective is P0 or P1, or, when the objective is P2, the poorest in MICs are at a 
comparable level to the poorest in LICs. This argument is strengthened if targeting is more 
effective in MICs. More generally, however, it seems clear that there cannot be a blanket 
argument for excluding MICs and the poor who live in them from development assistance. 
The argument has to be more detailed and country specific on the volume and nature of 
assistance given to individual MICs. 
 
3b.  Spillovers, Knowledge Transfer, and Exploitative Relations 
 
 A class of arguments increasingly deployed for continued development assistance 
engagement with MICs is to do with cross-border and global spillovers, and global public 
goods. Thus even if there was no inherent reason to be concerned about MICs and their 
poverty, if the actions of MICs have negative spillover effects on LICs and their poor, this 
is an indirect reason for the concern. There are many examples of such spillovers, including 
global warming and other environmental externalities, financial crises and their spillover 
effects, the spread of infectious diseases, and migration. The flip side of these negative 
externalities is that attempts to address them are cross-national public goods, in some cases 
global public goods. There is clearly an argument for development assistance to be directed 
towards such public goods, and hence for aid flows to countries that are part of the solution 
to the underlying negative externalities. 
 
 However, as argued in Kanbur (2003), the detailed specification of the international 
public goods problem is important in assessing whether development assistance is 
warranted, and its precise nature. Many of the arguments (eg on financial crises), have 
nothing in particular to do with poverty in MICs. Other arguments, for example  
deforestation in MICs that is caused by poverty and the spillover effects of this onto 
neighbouring countries that are LICs, are indeed affected by the numbers of poor people in 
these MICs. Drawing the line from the new geography of global poverty to continued 
development assistance to MICs through international public goods thus needs country 
specific argument. 
 
 The knowledge transfer case for continued engagement with MICs is often 
advanced by international agencies such as the World Bank. This aspect of assistance is 
highlighted, for example, in a major assessment of World Bank assistance to MICs 
(Independent Evaluation Group, 2007). The basic argument is that by engaging with MICs 
the agency gains knowledge which can then be useful for development assistance to LICs. 
The specific case for continued engagement with poverty reduction in MICs would thus be 
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that knowledge gained in this, for example on the operation of safety nets, would be useful 
in addressing poverty issues in LICs.  
 
But two issues need to be confronted. First, is the knowledge transferable - are 
conditions similar enough for information to be useful in a different context? For example, 
if social safety nets succeed in MICs because of their greater implementation capacity, will 
this be useful in LICs without such capacity? Or will the knowledge of what specific types 
of capacity are need be useful in building such capacity in LICs? Secondly, is the agency in 
question, or the international community in general, geared up for such knowledge transfer 
across countries? Answers to these questions are country specific, and agency specific. It is 
only when they are provided that we will have the basis for applying the general knowledge 
transfer argument to the case of continued development cooperation engagement with 
MICs in the new geography of global poverty. 
 
 All of the discussion so far has been on the basis of a moral obligation to transfer 
resources to the poor of the world simply because they are poor. The intervening fact of 
nation states, and the distribution of poverty across nation states, appears as a constraint, or 
as a set of instruments, to achieve global poverty reduction. However, nation states can 
have another role via the discourse on the salient moral community for obligations. This 
large literature has had a recent interesting, and powerful, addition and extension by Miller 
(2010). Miller’s starting point is the Singer (1972) Principle of Sacrifice, a powerful call on 
the wealthy to support the poor and destitute no matter where they are: “If it is in our power 
to prevent something bad from happening, without merely sacrificing anything else morally 
significant, we ought, morally, to do so.” 
  
Miller constructs a detailed and intricate argument rejecting the Singer premise as 
being too demanding and, ultimately, not being morally compelling. He concludes that:  
“The moral demands of sensitivity to neediness….have turned out to be limited…, which 
could have an enormous impact on transnational duties to people in developing countries.” 
(Miller, p. 2010, p. 29). Rather he builds the argument for development assistance on 
different foundations:  “The vast, unmet global responsibility is not a duty of kindness 
toward the needy. It is, primarily, a duty to avoid taking advantage of people in developing 
countries. …The crucial global interactions, in which power is currently massively abused, 
include transnational manufacturing, deliberations setting the institutional framework for 
world trade and finance, the global greenhouse effect and the efforts to contain it, the 
shaping of development policies, and uses of violence in maintaining influence over 
developing countries….” 
 
Miller’s argument, although perhaps somewhat at a tangent to the new global 
geography of poverty, supports continued development assistance to the poor in MICs, on 
the grounds of the abuse of transnational power towards the nations in which they live. The 
argument is focused neither on MICs nor on LICs, but rather on the extent to which the 
relationship between the country in question and developed countries is exploitative and 
abusive in nature. Country specificity matters once again. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
The new geography of global poverty throws into sharp relief development 
assistance policy towards MICs. A policy of sharply reducing, or entirely stopping, 
development assistance to MICs needs to be examined closely when the bulk of the world’s 
poor live in these countries. Our discussion shows that there is no justification for a blanket 
exclusion of MICs from development assistance. Rather, we argue that the policy has to be 
crafted on a country specific basis, taking into account the detailed nature of poverty in 
each MIC, and the specific institutional and implementation context of development 
assistance. More information and research is needed, in particular, on (i) how patterns of 
poverty differ across MICs and between MICs and LICs, (ii) how poverty in MICs may 
lead to cross-border negative externalities to other countries, especially LICs and the poor 
who live in them, (iii) how knowledge gained from addressing poverty in MICs could be 
used in designing poverty reduction interventions in other MICs or in LICs, and (iv) the 
specific power imbalances in economic relationships between MICs and developed 
countries. 
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